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Abstract
We develop a theory of capital-market imperfections to study how the ability to
enforce contracts aﬀects resource allocation across entrepreneurs of diﬀerent produc-
tivities, and across industries with diﬀerent needs for external ﬁnancing. The theory
implies that countries with a poor ability to enforce contracts are characterized by the
use of ineﬃcient technologies, low aggregate TFP, low development of ﬁnancial mar-
kets, large diﬀerences in labor productivity across industries, and large employment
shares in industries with low productivity. These implications of our theory are sup-
ported by the empirical evidence. The theory also suggests that entrepreneurs have a
vested interest in maintaining a status quo with low enforcement since it allows them
to extract rents from the factor services they hire.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
One of the most important research questions faced by economists is why poor countries use
productive resources ineﬃciently. Evidence suggests that poor countries are characterized by
i) low aggregate total-factor productivity (TFP), ii) large diﬀerences in output per worker
across industries, and iii) high employment shares in sectors with the lowest labor produc-
tivity in the economy. Moreover, relative prices diﬀer systematically between rich and poor
countries.1 These observations raise many important questions in economic development:
Why do poor countries use ineﬃcient technologies? Why do they allocate productive re-
sources ineﬃciently? What prevents labor in poor countries to move to the sectors with the
highest labor productivity? What accounts for cross-country diﬀerences in relative prices?
In this paper we propose a theory of capital-market imperfections that can account for
the above observations. Our focus on capital-market imperfections is motivated by evidence
indicating that capital markets tend to perform badly in poor countries and that produc-
tivity is positively correlated with indicators of ﬁnancial development across countries (see
Levine (1997), and Erosa (2001)). Motivated by the empirical ﬁndings in Laporta et al.
(1998), we study how the ability to enforce contracts aﬀects resource allocation and total
factor productivity in the model economy.2 We ﬁnd that economies with low enforcement are
characterized by the use of ineﬃcient technologies, low aggregate TFP, low development of
ﬁnancial markets, large diﬀerences in labor productivity across industries, and large employ-
ment shares in industries with low-productivity. In our theory, capital-market imperfections
also generate cross-country diﬀerences in relative prices and allow entrepreneurs to extract
1Prescott (1998), Hall and Jones (1999, 2000), and Parente and Prescott (2000) argue that cross-country
diﬀerences in TFP are crucial for understanding income inequality across countries. Since the work of
Kuznets (1966), it is well known that developing countries face substantial diﬀerences in labor productivity
across sectors in the economy. More recently, Gollin et al. (2002), Restuccia et al. (2003), and Van
Biesebroeck (2005) emphasize that in poor countries agriculture has, relative to non-agriculture, very low
labor productivity. Restuccia and Urrutia (2001) and Restuccia et al. (2003) document that relative prices
vary systematically across rich and poor countries.
2Laporta et al. (1998) ﬁnd that poor countries are characterized by poor law enforcement and low
accounting standards, which negatively impacts on the development of their capital markets.
2economic rents.
The theory builds on a growth model with a ﬁnal-goods sector and many intermediate-
goods industries. The technology to produce intermediate goods is symmetric across indus-
tries but for a ﬁxed cost of operation, which varies across sectors and is meant to capture
the observation that some industries rely more heavily on external ﬁnancing than others
(as documented by Rajan and Zingales (1998)). The production of intermediate goods is
organized by entrepreneurs who need to borrow in order to operate their technologies at
optimal scales. External ﬁnancing is aﬀected by two problems: First, the productivity of
entrepreneurs cannot be observed by lenders. Second, due to limited enforcement, a lender
can enforce contract payments from a borrower only up to a fraction of the borrower’s net
worth. In this environment, ﬁnancial intermediaries arise as an incentive-compatible and
enforcement-feasible mechanism for the allocation of resources to their most productive use.
In our economy, the degree of enforcement determines the contracting environment and,
as a result, the optimal way to provide incentives. We can then analyze how an exoge-
nous variation in the capacity to enforce contracts across model economies aﬀects resource
allocation.
We ﬁnd that low enforcement leads to the use of technologies with low productivity be-
cause of two eﬀects: First, low enforcement implies a low ability to punish entrepreneurs
who lie about the true value of their investment opportunity. Second, general equilibrium
price eﬀects (such as depressed wages and inﬂated output prices) make the operation of low-
productivity technologies proﬁtable. When enforcement is perfect, only the high-productivity
technology is proﬁtable, and output per worker is constant across industries. When enforce-
ment is imperfect, and the output of some or all industries is constrained by enforcement
problems, output per worker varies across industries and is higher in the industries facing a
more binding enforcement constraint. Thus, poor countries in our theory are characterized
(relative to rich countries) by large cross-industry productivity diﬀerentials. We also show
that this prediction of the theory is supported by the data: Using cross-country data on
industries in the manufacturing sector, we document that labor productivity is much more
unequally distributed across industries in poor than it is in rich countries.
3What precludes factors of production from moving to the sectors where they are most
productive? In our theory, it is limited enforcement that generates a barrier to factor mo-
bility across industries. Sectors with the highest returns are exactly the ones with the most
binding enforcement constraints, where the scale of production is restricted by the limited
commitment of entrepreneurs to pay for the factor services. An increase in enforcement
then allows for factor inputs to be allocated more eﬃciently across entrepreneurs and indus-
tries, diminishing the dispersion in labor productivity across industries. The theory implies
that capital-market imperfections reduce employment more in the sectors that rely heavily
on external ﬁnancing. As a result, the share of employment in these sectors is predicted
to be positively associated with the level of ﬁnancial development (enforcement). Using
the measures of external-ﬁnance dependence across industries in Rajan and Zingales (1998)
and cross-country data on employment across industries in manufacturing, we ﬁnd evidence
supporting this prediction of the theory (see section 2).
Our paper is closely related to the seminal work of Parente and Prescott (1999, 2000) in
that we also build a theory to explain why ineﬃcient technologies are used in equilibrium.
While Parente and Prescott (1999, 2000) study equilibria with monopoly-type arrangements,
we develop a theory of TFP with competitive markets. In our theory, entrepreneurs take
prices as given, but the equilibrium allocation resembles the outcome of a collusive agree-
ment. Capital-market imperfections constrain entrepreneurial output, increasing the price of
the output good produced by entrepreneurs and depressing the equilibrium wage rate. Entre-
preneurs, as a class, beneﬁt from capital-market imperfections since they allow entrepreneurs
to extract rents. Our theory thus suggests that entrepreneurs may have a vested interest
in maintaining a status quo with low enforcement. Entrepreneurs could also extract rents
through a collusive agreement, but that would be diﬃcult to enforce since each entrepreneur
would face incentives to increase production. In our framework, capital-market imperfec-
tions provide an incentive-compatible mechanism beneﬁting entrepreneurs, a result that is
consistent with the views of Rajan and Zingales (2003). In discussing the impediments to ﬁ-
nancial development, Rajan and Zingales point out that industrial incumbents may lose with
ﬁnancial development since the latter breeds competition which, in turn, erodes incumbents’
4proﬁts.3
We view our contribution as complementary to the line of inquiry advocated in Prescott
(1998) and Hall and Jones (1999), who argue that a theory of TFP is crucial for under-
standing the economic development problem. Parente and Prescott (2000), Holmes and
Schmitz (2001), and Herrendorf and Teixeira (2003) build theories in which the protection
of monopoly rights impedes the adoption of superior technologies. In a framework in which
limited enforcement restricts the ability of the social planner to tax individuals and redistrib-
ute social surplus, Kocherlakota (2001) shows that limited enforcement and high inequality
are crucial for understanding why societies choose institutions leading to the ineﬃcient use
of the means of production. Sokoloﬀ and Engerman (2000) discuss episodes in economic
history in which inequality has aﬀected the course of development through its impact on
the institutions that have evolved. Our ﬁndings also point to the importance of inequality
and limited commitment but in the context of a growth model in which limited enforcement
aﬀects the provision of incentives in the capital markets. Following Townsend (1978), there
is a large literature studying how ﬁnancial intermediaries emerge endogenously to improve
resource allocation.4 In this paper we analyze how enforcement limitations aﬀect the con-
tracting problem faced by ﬁnancial intermediaries.5 However, the main contribution of our
paper is to study limited enforcement in a multisector general-equilibrium model. To our
knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper in the literature to build a theory addressing the cross-
industry implications of capital-market imperfections. We also present novel evidence in
support of the implications of the theory.6
3While we do not model the reasons to explain why enforcement diﬀers across countries, our theory does
oﬀer some interesting clues. For a political economy theory of technological change see Krusell and Ríos-Rull
(1996).
4See, for instance, Bencivenga and Smith (1991), Boyd and Prescott (1986), Greenwood and Jovanovic
(1990), Imrohoroglu and Kumar (2002), and Levine (1997) for a survey.
5In a related paper, Castro et al. (2003) also study how investor protection (limited enforcement) aﬀects
credit markets that are subject to private information problems, but they focus on capital accumulation
rather than on TFP.
6Rajan and Zingales (1998) were the ﬁrst ones to ﬁnd empirical support for the idea that capital-market
imperfections aﬀect industries diﬀerently.
5The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents cross-country data on employment,
ﬁnancial dependence, and the labor productivity by industry that motivates the theory
developed in this paper. Section 3 presents the model economy. The contracting problem
faced by entrepreneurs is discussed in Section 4. In Section 5 we study the general equilibrium
of our economy and analyze the implications of cross-country diﬀerences in enforcement for
economic development. Section 6 concludes. Proofs are collected in an appendix.
2 Industry Data across Countries
This section presents evidence motivating the theoretical approach of the paper. First, we
compare two broad sectors in the economy: agriculture and non-agriculture. Second, we
consider the industries within the manufacturing sector. The ﬁrst observation is that poor
countries are characterized by a very low labor productivity in the agricultural sector.
Observation 1: The labor productivity in the agricultural sector relative to the non-
agricultural sector is much lower in poor than in rich countries. Relative to rich countries,
poor countries employ a large fraction of their labor force in agriculture.
Figure 1 graphs the labor productivity of workers in the agricultural sector (as a fraction
of labor productivity in manufacturing) for a cross-section of countries in the year 1985.7
While labor productivity in agriculture is about 67 percent of labor productivity in non-
agriculture for the richest 10 percent of countries in the world, it is only 4 percent for the
poorest 10 percent of countries. Despite this fact, poor countries allocate a large fraction of
the labor force in agriculture: The poorest 10 percent of countries employ 82 percent of the
labor force in agriculture. On the contrary, the employment share of agriculture is low in rich
countries, with the top 10 percent of the richest countries employing 5 percent of workers
(see Figure 1, panel b). Next, we focus on industries within the manufacturing sector.
Observation 2: Relative to rich countries, poor countries exhibit large diﬀerences in
7We thank Diego Restuccia for providing us with the data on employment and labor productivity in
agriculture (the data is available in his website). The original source of data is the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO).
6labor productivity across industries in the Manufacturing sector.
We use data from UNIDO (2003) to compute for each country the dispersion in log-
output per worker across industries in Manufacturing. Table 1 reports that the standard
deviation of the logarithm of output per worker across industries was .91 during the period
1996-2000 among countries with less than 10,000 dollars of per-capita income in the year
2000. This statistic is a much lower .50 among countries with more than 20,000 dollars of
per-capita income in the year 2000. The cross-country data plotted in Figure 2 reveal that
the dispersion in labor productivity is negatively correlated with per-capita income across
countries, with a correlation coeﬃcient of −.65.
Observation 3: Relative to rich countries, poor countries exhibit large diﬀerences in
labor productivity across workers in the Manufacturing sector.
The fact that in poor countries labor productiviy is highly unequal across industries,
does not necessarily imply that it is also highly unequal across workers. This is because the
dispersion in labor productivity across workers is also determined by how labor productivity
covaries with employment across industries. To measure inequality in labor productivity
across workers we compute a Gini index for each country during the period 1996-2000.8 The
results are plotted in Figure 3. We ﬁnd a strong negative relationship between the Gini index
of labor productivity and per capita income across countries, with a correlation coeﬃcient
of −.80. Moreover, the dispersion in labor productivity varies substantially across countries:
While the Gini index for countries with more than 20,000 dollars of per-capita income in the
year 2000 is, on average, .16., it increases by a factor of two (to a value of .38) in countries
with less than 10,000 dollars of per capita income in the year 2000 (see Table 1).
The above observations raise important questions about economic development: Why do
8For each country, we order the 28 industries in the UNIDO (2003) data by their productivities (with
the ﬁrst industry having the lowest productivity), and consider 28 subsets of industries such that the n-
th subset contains industries from 1 to n. We then compute the shares of the aggregate manufacturing
employment and output for each of the 28 subsets of industries. The data obtained describes the Lorenz
Curve of the distribution of labor productivity in manufacturing, which graphs the cumulative share of value
added against the cumulative share of employment by each of the 28 industry groups. The Gini index is
computed as twice the area between the 45-degree line and the Lorenz curve.
7Table 1: Summary of Data across Countries: Manufacturing Industry (1996-2000)
Country Category∗
Poor Middle Rich
Labor productivity across industries:
Coeﬃcient of variation 1.5 1.42 .80
Standard deviation of ln .91 .68 .50
Labor productivity across workers:
Gini Index .38 .27 .16
The ﬁrst panel reports two measures of inequality in labor productivity across indus-
tries in the manufacturing sector. The second panel reports the shares of employment
in manufacturing by industries at the bottom 25% and at the bottom 50% of the
labor productivity distribution.
∗The countries are divided in three income groups according to their real GDP per
capita in the year 2000. The Poor group includes countries with less than $10000 of
income; the Rich group includes countries with more than $20000 of income; other
countries belong to the Middle group.
Source: Real GDP per capita from Penn World Tables. Data on industries across
c o u n t r i e si so b t a i n e df r o mU N I D O .
poor countries exhibit large cross-industry productivity diﬀerentials relative to rich countries?
Why is labor productivity so unequally distributed across workers in poor countries? What
prevents workers from moving to the sectors with the highest labor productivity? We now
discuss evidence that capital-market imperfections may provide an explanation for these
puzzling observations.
Observation 4: Industries diﬀer in their dependence on external ﬁnancing. The share
of manufacturing-employment by industries with high external dependence increases with the
level of ﬁnancial development across countries. The opposite is true for industries with low
external dependence. Moreover, the within-country variation in labor productivity across
8industries that diﬀer in their reliance on external ﬁnance decreases with the level of ﬁnancial
development across countries.
In an inﬂuential paper, Rajan and Zingales (1998) provide evidence that industries diﬀer
in their needs for external funds. They argue that the industry demand for external ﬁnancing
is determined by technological factors. For instance, because the pharmaceutical industry
requires large initial investments, it is much more dependent on external ﬁnancing than the
average industry in the economy. Using the industry measures of external dependence in
Rajan and Zingales (1998), we divide industries in the Manufacturing sector evenly into
three groups according to their dependence on external ﬁnancing (low, medium, and high).
For each country, we compute the share of employment during the period 1996-2000 across
the three industry categories. Countries are split evenly in three groups according to their
level of ﬁnancial development, as measured by the amount of credit to private enterprises
divided by GDP. Note that the facts that we report next are not sensitive to the time
period analyzed and to the grouping of countries and industries. Figures 4 and 5 show
that the distribution of employment across the industry groups varies systematically with
the level of ﬁnancial development: The share of employment in industries that rely heavily
on external ﬁnancing tends to be increasing with the level of ﬁnancial development, with
a correlation coeﬃcient of .33. Moreover, the share of employment in industries that are
the least dependent on external ﬁnancing tends to be decreasing with the level of ﬁnancial
development, with a correlation coeﬃcient of −.40. Table 2 presents summary statistics.
While the industry category that relies heavily on external ﬁnancing accounts for 33% of
the aggregate employment in Manufacturing in the countries with low levels of ﬁnancial
development, it accounts for 49% of the Manufacturing employment in countries with a high
level of ﬁnancial development. Moreover, countries with low levels of ﬁnancial development
employ 30% of the manufacturing labor force in sectors that have the least dependence on
external ﬁnancing, while countries with the highest level of ﬁnancial development employ
only 11% percent in similar sectors.
Table 3 reveals that the dispersion in output per worker across the three industry-
categories is substantially larger in countries with low than it is in countries with high
9Table 2: Employment-Shares and External Dependence (1996-2000)
Countries by ﬁnancial development
Low Medium High
Industries by external dependence:
Low .30 .20 .11
Medium .37 .38 .40
High .33 .42 .49
The three groups of industries were formed according to their external dependence,
as measured by Rajan and Zingales (1998). Industries were splited evenly across
the three groups. Countries were divided evenly into three groups (Low, Medium,
and High) according to the level of ﬁnancial development as measured by the credit
to private enterprises divided by GDP (Levine 1997).
Each column reports the distribution of employment across the three industry
categories deﬁned by their external dependence. Each column corresponds to a
diﬀerent country group deﬁned by their level of ﬁnancial development.
ﬁnancial development. While in poor countries output per worker varies from 1.29 to .80 of
manufacturing labor productivity for industries with low and high external dependence, this
variation in output per worker is substantially smaller for countries with high development
of ﬁnancial markets and ranges from 1.14 to .99. While one may expect output per worker to
vary across industries (due to diﬀerences in the skill and capital intensities of industries), it is
a striking observation that the dispersion in labor productivity − across industries that diﬀer
in their needs for external funds − tends to diminish with the level of ﬁnancial development
in the cross-country data.
10Table 3: Labor Productivity and External Dependence (1996 − 2000)
Countries by ﬁnancial development:
Low Medium High
Industries by external dependence:
Low 1.29 1.34 1.14
Medium 1.08 .99 .91
High .80 .90 .99
Labor productivity is computed as value added per worker. For each industry
category, we add up the value added of all industries in the group and divide that
sum by the total number of workers in the industry group. The resulting value is
expressed as a fraction of the labor productivity in the manufacturing sector.
Industry groups and country groups were constructed as in Table 2.
3 The Economy
We now present a theory of capital-market imperfections that provides an explanation for
the observations documented in Section 2.
Agents
The economy is populated by two groups of agents: i) two-period lived overlapping
generations of entrepreneurs and by ii) households. Entrepreneurs are endowed with 1
unit of labor in each period of their lives and with a production technology when old. At
age 2, entrepreneurs choose whether to operate their technology or work for someone else.
Entrepreneurs are risk neutral and consume by the end of their second period of life. We
assume that households are inﬁnitely lived and that they make consumption and savings
decisions as in the standard Cass-Koopmans growth model. This assumption is made for
simplicity, and it implies that the steady-state interest rate is equal to the households’ rate of
time preference ( 1
β−1, where β denotes the discount rate). We could obtain similar results by
11considering a storage technology or by modeling a small open economy that takes the interest
rate as given. The aggregate labor supply is given by the sum of the labor endowments of
households, young entrepreneurs, and old entrepreneurs who decide to work for a wage.
Assuming no population growth, we normalize the mass of inﬁnitely-lived households to 1
and denote by   the size of each cohort of entrepreneurs.
Production
At each point in time, there are n +1produced goods: a single ﬁnal good and n inter-
mediate goods. The ﬁnal output good is produced by combining capital K,l a b o rN,a n d
intermediate goods inputs Z according to a constant-returns-to-scale technology
















is a C.E.S. aggregator of intermediate goods. We assume that
ﬁrms in the ﬁnal-goods sector sector take prices as given, and thus these ﬁrms make zero
proﬁts in equilibrium. Without loss of generality, the number of ﬁrms in the ﬁnal-goods
sector sectors is normalized to 1. Capital depreciates at a rate δ.
Intermediate goods are produced combining ﬁxed and variable inputs. The ﬁxed inputs
are the entrepreneurial time and a ﬁxed amount of consumption goods, where the latter
varies across industries. The variable inputs are capital and labor services. An entrepreneur
in industry j incurs ﬁxed production costs fj, uses capital Kj and labor Nj to produce
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,w h e r eAi can take the values
{Al,A h} representing low- and high-productivity technologies (Ah >A l), respectively, and b Z
represents the maximum scale of operation of the entrepreneurial technology. It is important
to notice that the entrepreneurial technology features increasing returns to scale. Due to
t h ep r e s e n c eo fﬁxed inputs in the production technology, the per-unit cost of production
decreases as the scale of production increases.
We assume that each entrepreneur is born with a technology to operate in only one
industry, so that the total number of entrepreneurs in each industry is given by  /n,a n d
that the fraction of low-productivity entrepreneurs is equal to ν in all industries. The ﬁxed
cost fj varies across industries and is meant to capture the fact that industries have diﬀerent
cash-ﬂows and needs for external ﬁnancing, as emphasized by Rajan and Zingales (1998).
12As industries with a higher ﬁxed cost fj require a higher expenditure, the ﬁnancing problem
faced by entrepreneurs diﬀers across industries.
We assume that entrepreneurs take prices as given. Entrepreneurs face a constant mar-
ginal cost of production and, due to the ﬁxed inputs, a decreasing average cost. The marginal
cost of production (in terms of consumption goods) does not vary across industries but varies
across entrepreneurs with diﬀerent productivity. The marginal cost for type i entrepreneurs
is obtained from the following cost-minimization problem
yi ≡ min
K,N




where i =∈ {h,l} and (r,w) are the cost of capital and labor services, respectively. It is easy
to show that yi = 1
Ai( r
α)α( w
1−α)1−α . Notice that the marginal cost of production does not
depend on the scale of project operation as long as the output is below b Z.M o r e o v e r ,t h e
marginal cost of a low-type entrepreneur relative to a high-type entrepreneur is equal to the




Al . These properties will be useful for solving
analytically the contracting problem faced by entrepreneurs.
Financial Intermediaries
In our framework, ﬁnancial intermediaries arise as an incentive-compatible mechanism to
allocate resources among entrepreneurs. In order to operate their technology at an eﬃcient
scale, an entrepreneur needs to raise external funds as his net worth does not provide suﬃ-
cient resources (entrepreneur’s net worth η is given by w(1 + r − δ)).E x t e r n a lﬁnancing is
diﬃcult due to two capital-market imperfections: First, ﬁnancial intermediaries can enforce
contract payments up to a fraction of borrowers’ resources. In particular, we assume that
entrepreneurs can commit to pay at most a fraction φ of output. Second, the ability of
entrepreneurs is not known by the lenders.
We assume that ﬁnancial intermediaries announce contracts before entrepreneurs learn
their type. This assumption implies that private information is revealed after contracting,
and it is made in order to avoid the problems of the non-existence of equilibria that arise
with adverse selection (See, for instance, Prescott and Townsend (1984)).9 Our main results
9As we show later, the eﬃcient allocation of resources among entrepreneurs in our framework requires
13should not be sensitive to this modeling assumption since it is intuitive that limited enforce-
ment makes the provision of incentives (separation of types) more diﬃcult, whether private
information is ex-ante or ex-post. An advantage of our approach is that it allows us to obtain
a simple analytical solution to the contracting problem faced by intermediaries. We assume
that ﬁnancial intermediaries announce production plans and repayment schedules for each
type of entrepreneur. A production plan speciﬁes, for each type of entrepreneur, the fraction
of entrepreneurs that work for a wage, the fraction of entrepreneurs that get to operate their
technology, the resources available for operating the technology (capital and labor services),
and the repayment schedules. Payments are constrained by enforcement problems since we
assume that entrepreneurs can commit to pay at most a fraction φ<1 of output. The
timing of events can be summarized as follows:
1. Entrepreneurs decide whether they want to contract with ﬁnancial intermediaries or
not.
2. Financial intermediaries write contracts in order to organize the production of inter-
mediate goods and to raise external funds. Contracts are represented by an 8 − tuple
©
(el,Z l,L l,L F
l ),(eh,Z h,L h,L F
h)
ª
. For each ability type i, the contract speciﬁes the
fraction of entrepreneurs ei that operate their production technology while the rest
(fraction 1 − ei) are assigned to work for a wage. For entrepreneurs who are called
to operate their technology, the contract speciﬁes how much output Zi they should
produce and how much they should pay (Li,L F
i ) to the ﬁnancial intermediary after
production has taken place (as discussed below, the payment is conditional on the
report that the entrepreneur makes to the intermediary). The ﬁnancial intermediary
ﬁnances production activities with external funds E and entrepreneurial net worth η.
3. Entrepreneurs learn their ability and report it to the ﬁnancial intermediary.
cross-subsidies across diﬀerent types of entrepreneurs. Consequently, eﬃciency requires that intermediaries
make positive proﬁts with some entrepreneurs and negative proﬁts with others. This outcome cannot be
supported as an equilibrium with free entry.
144. The ﬁnancial intermediary selects the entrepreneurs that operate production technolo-
gies for each type (presumably by a randomization device). These entrepreneurs incur
the production ﬁxed cost fj and hire capital and labor services with resources provided
by the ﬁnancial intermediary (type i entrepreneurs in industry j receive an amount
of resources worth yiZi + fj). The entrepreneurs that are not chosen to operate their
production technology do not receive resources and supply their labor services in the
labor market for a wage rate.
5. Production takes place. Entrepreneurs that operate their technology sell the output
of intermediate goods and make payments to the ﬁnancial intermediary. Since we
assume that production is publicly observable, ﬁnancial intermediaries learn whether
entrepreneurs have reported their true type or not. Loan repayments are contingent on
entrepreneurial type and their reports. Type-i entrepreneurs that have operated their
technology and reported truthfully their type pay Li.T y p e - i entrepreneurs that have
falsely reported their type pay LF
i (the superscript F stands for false). Because of lim-
ited enforcement, payments cannot exceed a fraction φ of the value of output. Thus, a
low value of φ implies a low ability to “punish” entrepreneurs that have misrepresented
their type.
We have assumed that ﬁnancial intermediaries can randomly select who, for each type
of entrepreneur, will be called to operate a project. This randomization device could be
interpreted as a form of credit rationing. We have allowed for randomization because it
is eﬃcient in our environment. Due to the discrete occupational choice, lotteries enhance
welfare by convexifying the production. Eﬃciency requires projects to be operated at a
maximum scale because the average cost of production is decreasing (due to ﬁxed costs).
Had we ruled out randomization, ﬁnancial intermediaries would have to use the scale of
production in order to ration resources across entrepreneurs. This will certainly make capital-
market imperfections much more detrimental to production eﬃciency than we are currently
considering. In this case, projects would not be run at an optimal scale and too many
projects would be operated. Our main results about the consequences of capital-market
15imperfections for production eﬃciency and economic rents do not depend on allowing for
randomization.
Financial intermediaries maximize entrepreneurs’ expected consumption subject to re-
source feasibility, enforcement, incentive compatibility, and participation constraints. The
allocation solving this maximization problem can be viewed as arising from competitive ﬁ-
nancial intermediaries bidding for loan contracts and with free entry in the intermediation
business. Below, we formally describe the decision problem faced by ﬁnancial intermedi-
aries. Because ﬁnancial intermediaries face a similar problem across industries, we focus
on one industry. To simplify notation we do not index allocations and intermediate goods
prices by the industry index although it should be understood that these objects will vary
across industries. We also normalize the number of entrepreneurs dealing with each ﬁnancial
intermediary to 1 in order to keep the notation simple.
Entrepreneurs’ consumption
The Revelation Principle allows us to focus, without loss of generality, on allocations
where entrepreneurs truthfully report their type. Consider an entrepreneur of type i who
operates his technology with probability ei. The entrepreneur obtains an output of interme-
diate goods worth qZi in terms of consumption goods, pays an amount Li to the ﬁnancial
intermediary, and consumes qZi−Li (where q is the price of the intermediate good produced
by the entrepreneur). With probability 1−ei the entrepreneur is assigned to work for others
and consumes his wage. The expected consumption of a type i entrepreneur is then given
by
ci = ei (qZi − Li)+( 1− ei)w. (2)
Entrepreneurs’ expected consumption when they contract with ﬁnancial intermediaries (be-
fore knowing their ability) is thus
c
e = νcl +( 1− ν)ch. (3)
Participation constraint
Since ﬁnancial intermediaries maximize entrepreneurs’ utility, and since they can achieve
any allocation that entrepreneurs can achieve on their own, entrepreneurs are (weakly) better
16oﬀ by contracting with ﬁnancial intermediaries. We shall later restrict model parameters so
that in general equilibrium with perfect enforcement, entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent between
contracting with a ﬁnancial intermediary or becoming workers. In this case, expected con-
sumption of an entrepreneur is equal to the sum of the wage rate and entrepreneurial net
worth: ce = w + η,w h e r eη = w(1 + r − δ). In equilibrium, a fraction of entrepreneurs
contract with ﬁnancial intermediaries, and the rest become workers. When enforcement is
imperfect, however, entrepreneurs will be strictly better oﬀ by contracting with a ﬁnancial
intermediary. The ﬁnancial intermediary selects the entrepreneurs who run projects and the
ones who work.
Enforcement and Incentive Compatibility Constraints
Since the ability type is not publicly observed, contracts are written so that entrepreneurs
have incentives to report their true type. The incentive compatibility constraint for a type
i is




i )+( 1− ej)w. (4)
At y p ei entrepreneur that falsely claims to be type j, will operate his productive technology
with probability ej. In this case, he will be assigned an amount of resources yjZj +f in order
to produce Zj units of output. With this amount of resources, however, type i entrepreneurs
will produce ZF
i =m i n {
yj
yiZj, b Z} =m i n {
Ai
AjZj, b Z} instead of Zj (recall that the ratio of
per-unit cost of production across entrepreneurs is equal to the inverse of their relative
productivity, and that output is bounded above by b Z). Since the entrepreneur pays LF
i to
the ﬁnancial intermediary when he misrepresents his type, he nets qZF
i − LF
i .
As ﬁnancial intermediaries have a limited ability to enforce repayments by entrepreneurs,
loan repayment is constrained by





Our contract does not allow ﬁnancial intermediaries to make lump sum transfers to low-
productivity entrepreneurs in order to give them incentives to reveal their types. By using
lump-sum transfers, ﬁnancial intermediaries could minimize the amount of projects operated
by entrepreneurs with low productivity. We have ruled out transfers because they would not
17be feasible under a mild (and reasonable) variation of the economic environment. To make
this point clear, consider the case where the economy has a large number of individuals who
do not face any opportunity costs of pretending to be a bad type of entrepreneur. Then,
if lump-sum transfers were part of the optimal contract, these individuals would have an
incentive to collect a transfer by claiming to be a bad type of entrepreneur, and the optimal
contract would not be resource feasible. It is also worth pointing out that our main results
still go through if we allow for lump-sum transfers. In particular, low-type entrepreneurs
will operate projects under suﬃciently low enforcement. For suﬃciently low enforcement,
general equilibrium prices will be such that the operation of low-productivity projects be-
comes proﬁtable for ﬁnancial intermediaries. As a result, low-productivity projects will still
be operated if we allow for lump-sum transfers.
Feasibility
We assume that each ﬁnancial intermediary deals with a suﬃciently large number of
entrepreneurs so that, by the law of large numbers, it faces a fraction ν of entrepreneurs with
low-quality projects. Financial intermediaries obtain funds from two sources: contributions
from entrepreneurs (net worth) and external funds. Because the ﬁnancing problem is intra-
period, the opportunity cost of funds is given by 1. Expenditures of a ﬁnancial intermediary
are then constrained by
νe l (Zl yl + f)+( 1− ν) eh (Zh yh + f)=E + η, (6)
where E denotes external funds raised by the ﬁnancial intermediary, and η represents entre-
preneurs’ net worth. In the contract, only a fraction ei of type i entrepreneurs are called to
operate their technology. Each of these entrepreneurs receives an amount of resources worth
Zi yi + f in terms of consumption goods, where yi denotes the marginal cost of production
faced by type i entrepreneurs. Payments collected at the end of the period should satisfy
E = νe l Ll +( 1− ν) eh Lh. (7)
Notice that with technologies exhibiting increasing returns to scale, it is optimal for en-
trepreneurs to pool their net worth and redistribute it across the operated projects. By
18allowing entrepreneurs to pool their resources, we are making capital-market imperfections
less severe.
Intermediaries’ Problem
The objective of ﬁnancial intermediaries is to maximize the expected consumption of
entrepreneurs by choosing
©
(cl,e l,Z l,L l,L F
l ),(ch,e h,Z h,L h,LF
h),E
ª
in order to solve
Max {νcl +( 1− ν)ch}
s.t. (4) − (7).
Contracts have to be incentive, resource, participation, and enforcement feasible. Financial
intermediaries take the prices of intermediate goods and factor services as given.
Market Clearing
We end the description of the economic environment with the market-clearing conditions.







[1 + ν(1 − elj(t)) + (1 − ν)(1− ehj(t))],
where   denotes the measure of entrepreneurs and Nz(t) denotes the labor used in the










k(t)+ w(t − 1) = Ky(t)+Kz(t),
where k(t) is the capital supplied by households,  w(t − 1) is the capital supplied by












Zj(t)= [νelj(t)Zlj(t)+( 1− ν)eh(t)Zhj(t)], for j =1 ,...,n.
4. Consumption good





fj [νelj(t)+( 1− ν)ehj(t)] = Y (t),





j(t),c (t) denotes households’ consumption, ce
j(t) represents
consumption of entrepreneurs in industry j (as deﬁn e di ne x p r e s s i o n( 3 ) ) ,a n dK(t)=
Kz(t)+Ky(t) is the aggregate capital stock in the economy.
4T h e O p t i m a l C o n t r a c t
In this section, we characterize, for ﬁxed prices, the allocation that maximizes entrepreneurs’
consumption subject to resource feasibility, participation, enforcement, and incentives con-
straints. Our main result is that under suﬃciently low enforcement, capital-market imper-
fections can lead to the use of ineﬃcient technologies. We consider the contracting problem
of one industry and, for simplicity of notation, we omit the subscript j indexing industries.
To start, note that it is optimal to operate the entrepreneurial technology at its max-
imum scale b Z, a result that follows from the increasing returns-to-scale property of the
entrepreneurial technology.
Lemma 1. In an optimal contract, a project is operated only at its maximum scale of
operation b Z.
The intermediary, in principle, would like to operate only projects of high productivity
(set eh > 0 and el =0 ) . However, this goal is not feasible when entrepreneurs of low
productivity have incentives to misrepresent their type. Using (4) we know that when el =0 ,





l )+( 1− eh)w. (8)




b Z (since projects are
operated at maximum scale). To deter lying, it is optimal to set the punishment for lying to
the maximum possible value which implies
L
F
l = φq b Z. (9)
Combining (8) and (9), it is easy to see that lying is not optimal if the wage rate is higher
than the proﬁts made by operating the production technology, that is, if w ≥ q
Al
Ah(1 −
φ)b Z. The right-hand side of this inequality is decreasing in the enforcement parameter φ.
Intuitively, we see that the higher the enforcement parameter φ, the higher the ability to
punish entrepreneurs that misreport their type. Moreover, we shall see that, in general
equilibrium, an increase in enforcement φ leads to an increase in the wage rate w and to a
decrease in the price of intermediate goods q. The changes in relative prices associated with
an increase in enforcement thus further reduce the incentives of low-quality entrepreneurs to
lie.
We now focus on determining the amount that low-productivity entrepreneurs are asked
to repay when they operate their technology. To this end, let us express the repayment of
low-type entrepreneurs as Ll = χq b Z,w h e r eχ ∈ [0,φ]. The optimal choice of χ involves
the following trade-oﬀ: On the one hand, maximizing repayments by low-productivity en-
trepreneurs allows the ﬁnancial intermediary to raise more external funds and fund more
projects. As a result, maximizing the repayment by low-type entrepreneurs (χ = φ) max-
imizes the amount of resources devoted to the production of intermediate goods. On the
other hand, minimizing repayments by low-productivity entrepreneurs improves the ratio of
good-to-bad technologies in operation. Consequently, output per unit of productive resources
increases. In order to show this last point, we set the incentive-compatibility constraint of
low-productivity entrepreneurs at equality and use the fact that projects are operated at its








b Z − w/q
. (10)
Note that the ratio of high-to-low productivity projects operated (
eh
el )i sd e c r e a s i n gi nt h e
repayment of low-productivity entrepreneurs (χ) because expected consumption of low-
21productivity entrepreneurs decreases with the amount they are asked to pay (χ) and in-
creases with the fraction of low-productivity entrepreneurs that operate their technology
(el). Then, when the incentive constraint for low-productivity entrepreneurs binds, an in-
crease in repayment χ requires an increase in el for the constraint not to be violated. A
higher repayment by low-productivity entrepreneurs (χ) is thus associated with a lower ratio
of high-to-low productivity projects in operation (
eh
el ).
In Lemma 2 we show that the aforementioned trade-oﬀ is resolved in favour of a corner
solution: The optimal contract prescribes either χ =0or χ = φ. The proof of Lemma 2 relies
on the fact that the optimal contract can be expressed as a linear-programming problem.
Lemma 2:I fel > 0, then either Ll =0or Ll = φq b Z.
The fraction of low projects operated in equilibrium is obtained by combining (at equality)


















We can now characterize the optimal contract.
Proposition 1 (Low Enforcement). If the incentive-compatibility constraint for low-
productivity entrepreneurs binds ( w<q
Al
Ah(1 − φ)b Z ), then the optimal contract has the
following properties:
i) Both low- and high-productivity technologies are operated ((el,e h) are given by (10) and
(11)).
ii) The ratio between the number of low- to high-productivity technologies in operation (el/eh)
decreases with the level of enforcement (φ).
iii) When the low-productivity technology is proﬁtable ((q−yl)∗ b Z−f>w ), low-productivity
entrepreneurs are required to transfer a fraction φ of their output to the ﬁnancial in-
termediary by the end of the period (χ = φ). When the low-productivity technology is
22not proﬁtable ((q−yl)∗ b Z −f<w ), low-productivity entrepreneurs are not required to
m a k eat r a n s f e rt ot h eﬁnancial intermediary at the end of the period (χ =0 ) .
We say that the low-productivity technology is proﬁtable when the proﬁt from operating
this technology is higher than the opportunity cost of the entrepreneur’s time, that is, b Z(q−
yl) − f ≥ w. Proposition 1 shows that when the low-productivity technology is proﬁtable,
it is optimal to set χ = φ so that the number of projects in operation is maximized (even if
this involves a decrease in the average productivity of the technologies in operation). On the
contrary, when the low-productivity technology is not proﬁtable, it is optimal to set χ =0
in order to maximize the average productivity of the technologies in operation (even if this
comes at the cost of reducing the number of projects in operation).
It is worth noting that, for ﬁxed prices, an increase in enforcement leads to an increase in
the ratio of good-to-bad projects being operated (see equation (10)). In the next section of
the paper, we show that this eﬀect is ampliﬁed in general equilibrium. In fact, an increase in
the level of enforcement induces price changes that further increase the incentives to operate
high-productivity technologies relative to low-productivity technologies.
5 General Equilibrium
This section focuses on how limited enforcement aﬀects the contracting problem, and thus
allocations, in general equilibrium. In particular, we evaluate the predictions of the theory
for the variation of the equilibrium allocations across economies with diﬀerent enforcement
levels and discuss how these predictions relate to the cross-country observations documented
in section 2.
5.1 Optimal Contracts in General Equilibrium
The analysis below focuses on steady-state equilibria and consists of a comparative statics
exercise across economies that diﬀer in enforcement levels (φ). In order to obtain analytical
results, we assume that capital fully depreciates in a period (δ =1 ) .
23We deﬁne entrepreneurial rents as the ex-ante proﬁts (net of the opportunity costs of
entrepreneurs’ time)
πj ≡ (1 − ν)ehj
h




(qj − yl)b Z − w − fj
i
,
where the ﬁrst term of the sum represents the aggregate proﬁts from the operation of high-
productivity projects. Alternatively, entrepreneurial rents can be expressed as the industry
r e v e n u em i n u st h ec o s to fﬁxed inputs and payments to factors of production
πj = qjmj b Z − [mjfj + wNj + wmj + rKj], (12)
where mj ≡  
n[(1−ν)ehj +νelj] is the number of projects operated in industry j (recall that
 /n is the measure of entrepreneurs in each sector, ν is the fraction of entrepreneurs with
low productivity, and eij is the probability that an entrepreneur of type i in sector j will
operate his technology, where i = l,h, and j =1 ,...,n).
In equilibrium, intermediate goods are produced only if entrepreneurial rents are non-
negative (πj ≥ 0). The next proposition establishes that enforcement problems are at the
origin of (positive) entrepreneurial rents.
Proposition 2. Entrepreneurial rents in industry j are positive if and only if enforcement
in industry j binds (χh = φ).
Next, we derive an expression for output per worker in industry-j that will be useful for
the analysis that follows. Note that value added by industry j (VA j) is given by the value
of its output (qjmj b Z) minus the ﬁxed cost of operation in this industry (mjfj).U s i n g( 1 2 )
we obtain
VA j = qjmj b Z − mjfj = wNj + rKj + wmj + πj. (13)











where k is the capital-to-labor ratio (which is constant across industries since the production
technology has a constant capital intensity α across all industries), and
mj
Nj is the inverse of
the number of workers per project operated in industry j.
24In Proposition 3 (see below) we show that if enforcement is suﬃciently high (φ close to 1),
then in equilibrium the low-productivity technology is not used and proﬁts are equal to zero
in all industries. Since only the high-productivity technology is used in all industries, the
average quality of projects in operation does not vary across industries. Then, the number of
workers per entrepreneur (
Nj
mj) does not depend on j. Thus, setting πj =0in equation (14),
it follows that value added per worker (vaj) is equal across industries (does not depend on j).
Economies with high enforcement are thus characterized by high total-factor productivity,
no dispersion in value added per worker across industries, and no economic rents.
Since the enforcement constraints do not bind when φ is suﬃciently close to 1, as m a l l
change in φ around 1 does not aﬀect equilibrium allocations. As the capacity to raise external
funds decreases with φ, there exist a treshold level of enforcement φ
e and an industry ¯ j such
that, for all economies with φ in the left neighborhood of φ
e, the enforcement constraint
only binds in industry ¯ j. Proposition 2 implies that in these economies, equilibrium proﬁts
are equal to zero in all industries but industry ¯ j. Moreover, output per worker is higher
in industry ¯ j than in any other sector in the economy. While industry ¯ j features higher
marginal products of capital and labor than other sectors in the economy, factor inputs do
not move to industry ¯ j because this industry faces a binding enforcement constraint. The
allocation of productive resources in the economy is thus ineﬃcient. Unlike in the case with φ
close to 1, now a small increase in enforcement does have interesting consequences: It allows
factors of production to move towards industry ¯ j, thereby improving resource allocation. As
a result, the share of employment and the output produced by industry ¯ j rises with the level
of enforcement.
Proposition 3 also establishes that when enforcement is suﬃciently low (φ close to 0), the
low productivity technology is used in all industries. Here, a small increase in enforcement
implies that more resources can move from the ﬁnal-goods sector to the intermediate-goods
industries facing binding enforcement constraints. These changes in resource allocation are
accompanied by a decrease in the prices of intermediate goods and a rise in the wage rate.
Thus, the ratio w/qj increases with enforcement when the enforcement constraint of industry
j binds. These general equilibrium price eﬀects increase the reward of working relative to
25operating a technology so that the incentive-compatibility constraint of low-productivity en-
trepreneurs becomes less binding. We conclude that in economies where the low-productivity
technology is operated (economies with φ close to 0), an increase in enforcement leads to a
better selection of entrepreneurs (the ratio ehj/elj rises) and improves the average produc-
tivity of the projects operated.
The proof of Proposition 3 relies on the following two assumptions:10
Assumption A1. Let b Z ≥ z∗ (1+2 )




Assumption A2. The elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods is equal to 1
(ρ =0 ) .
Proposition 3. Assume A1-A2 hold. Consider steady-state equilibria of economies
that diﬀer in the level of enforcement φ, where φ ∈ [0,1]. There exists a treshold level of
enforcement φ
e < 1 such that
i) In economies with φ>φ
e, entrepreneurial rents are zero, the low-productivity technology
is not operated, value added per worker is equal across industries, and the distribution
o fw o r k e r sa c r o s si n d u s t r i e si sn o ta ﬀected by a small change in enforcement φ.
ii) In economies with φ<φ
e there is, at least, one industry for which the enforcement
constraint binds and entrepreneurial rents are positive. The higher the ﬁxed cost of an
industry, the more binding is the enforcement constraint of that industry.
10Assumption A1 ensures that the scale of operation is large enough so that when φ =1economic rents
are 0 and there are no productivity diﬀerentials across industries in the economy. This economy provides
a convenient benchmark. We emphasize that the important result in Proposition 3 is that a decrease in
φ leads to an increase in economic rents and higher inter-industry productivity diﬀerentials, a result that
does not require assumption A1 to hold. Assumption A2 implies a unitary elasticity of substitution between
intermediate goods in the production of ﬁnal goods, which simpliﬁes the algebra in the proof of Proposition
3. The elasticity of substitution plays an important role in determining how changes in enforcement aﬀect
labor productivity across industries. This issue is discussed in the next section of the paper.
26a) Value added per worker varies across industries: It is lowest in the ﬁnal-goods
sector and it is the highest in the industries where the enforcement constraint
binds the most (industries with the highest ﬁxed costs). The dispersion in labor
productivity across industries declines with an increase in enforcement.
b) The distribution of employment across industries varies with the level of enforce-
ment in the economy. A rise in the level of enforcement raises the number of
workers employed in industries with binding enforcement constraints. Moreover,
the higher the ﬁxed cost of the industry is, the more responsive is the employment
in the industry to changes in enforcement. As a result, industries with high ﬁxed
costs employ a low share of workers in economies with low enforcement.
c) If enforcement is suﬃciently low (φ close to 0), then the low-productivity technol-
ogy is operated in all industries. A small increase in enforcement increases the
fraction of high productivity technologies in operation.
Proposition 3 (part (i)) establishes that, in general equilibrium, entrepreneurial rents are
equal to zero in all sectors in the economy when enforcement is suﬃciently high. In this
case, high-quality entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent between operating their technologies and
working for others, and low-quality entrepreneurs strictly prefer to work instead of operating
their technology. The intuition behind this result is straightforward. In order to make up
for the opportunity cost of entrepreneurial time and the ﬁxed cost of operation, the price
of intermediate goods (qj) should be higher than the marginal cost of production (yh)i n
equilibrium. Since the price of intermediate goods is above its marginal cost, the contract
repayment by high-productivity entrepreneurs can be enforced in full as long as φ is close
to 1 (qj >y h implies φqj >y h). As a result, entrepreneurial production is not limited by
enforcement problems. By choosing the maximum scale of production b Z large enough, we
ﬁnd conditions such that the fraction of high-quality entrepreneurs operating their technology
is strictly less than 1 in equilibrium (ejh < 1). In this case, proﬁts from operating the high-
quality technology are equal to the wage rate, and high-quality entrepreneurs are indiﬀerent
about whether to operate or not ((qj − yh)b Z −w − f =0for all j =1 ,...,n). Moreover, the
27low-productivity technology is not proﬁtable (yl >y h implies that (qj −yl)b Z −w −f<0)).
We conclude that the low-productivity technology is not operated in any sector (ejl =0for
all j =1 ,...,n) and that entrepreneurial rents are equal to zero when enforcement is high.
In part (iii) of Proposition 3, we ﬁnd a restriction in the parameter space such that the
low-productivity technology is used, in equilibrium, in all sectors provided enforcement is low
enough (φ close to 0). This restriction on the parameters implies a lower bound on the share
of intermediate goods in the production function of ﬁnal goods (as stated in Assumption
A1). Intuitively, as the importance of intermediate goods in the production function rises
(μ increases), intermediate goods become more valuable. When enforcement is low (φ close
to 0) and intermediate goods are scarce (μ suﬃciently high), the price of intermediate goods
is high enough to encourage low-productivity entrepreneurs to operate their technology. In
this case, entrepreneurial rents are positive in all sectors.
Are the model predictions in Proposition 3 driven by the assumption that entrepreneurs
have a positive productivity in only one industry? In other words, would the proﬁts be
equalized across sectors if entrepreneurs were to face a nontrivial choice of industry? The
answer is no, provided that entrepreneurs are not equally productive across sectors. This
is because the key driving force behind positive proﬁts is scarcity, and scarcity is likely to
vary across industries that diﬀer in their needs for external ﬁnancing. Scarcity arises from
the fact that the resources used in an industry are bounded by the aggregate collateral that
entrepreneurs can provide, which is the sum of their aggregate net worth and a fraction φ
of the industry revenue from sales. The industry choice by entrepreneurs acts as a force
towards equalization of proﬁts across sectors: Sectors with the highest proﬁts attract more
entrepreneurs − and hence collateral − thereby increasing these industries’ output and re-
ducing their proﬁts. However, to the extent that entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in their
relative productivities across sectors, only a subset of entrepreneurs ﬁnds it proﬁtable to
operate in any given sector in the economy. Since the mobility decisions of entrepreneurs are
constrained by the distribution of their productivities across sectors, the extent of scarcity
is not necessarily equal across industries. Thus, in general, proﬁts vary across industries,
which together with (14) implies that output per worker varies across industries as well.
285.2 Implications for Development and the Evidence
Laporta et al. (1998) provide evidence that poor countries tend to be characterized by low
enforcement relative to rich countries. We now summarize the main predictions of the theory
regarding how enforcement aﬀects equilibrium allocations and compare these ﬁndings to the
cross-country data.
Total-Factor Productivity. Our theory implies that economies with low enforcement
exhibit low total-factor productivity, low aggregate output, and low development of their
ﬁnancial system (as measured by the amount of assets intermediated relative to output).
All of these implications are consistent with the empirical evidence (see Levine 1997). In
our framework, low enforcement leads to the use of technologies with low productivity as a
result of two eﬀects: First, low enforcement implies a poor ability to punish entrepreneurs
that lie about the true value of their investment opportunity (Proposition 1). Second, general
equilibrium price eﬀects (such as depressed wage rates and inﬂated output prices) make the
operation of low-productivity technologies proﬁtable (Proposition 3).
Economic Rents. Entrepreneurs do not extract economic rents when enforcement is
high but they do so in economies with low enforcement (Proposition 3). Entrepreneurs are
constrained in the amount of capital and labor that they can hire when enforcement is low
(because of their inability to commit payment). By restricting the aggregate demand for
factor inputs, limited enforcement puts downward pressure on factor prices. In equilibrium,
entrepreneurs pay factors of production an amount below their marginal product and extract
economic rents. The presence of economic rents suggests that entrepreneurs may have a
vested interest in maintaining a status quo with low enforcement. Our theory also implies
that income inequality (as measured by the entrepreneurial income relative to the wage rate)
is larger when capital markets do not function well.
Labor Productivity and Employment across Industries.W h e n e n f o r c e m e n t i s
high (φ suﬃciently close to 1), output per worker is constant across industries (Proposition
3). When enforcement constraints bind for some or all industries, output per worker varies
across industries and is higher in industries with more binding enforcement constraints. Poor
countries in our theory are characterized by large cross-industry productivity diﬀerentials rel-
29ative to rich countries. What precludes factors from moving to the sector where they are most
productive? The answer is that factors cannot move to the sectors with highest productivity
because entrepreneurs in these industries cannot commit to pay for their services. Limited
enforcement generates a barrier to factor mobility and, as a result, capital and labor are
ineﬃciently allocated across industries. An increase in the level of enforcement then allows
factor inputs to be allocated more eﬃciently across industries, diminishing the dispersion in
output per worker across sectors in the economy.
The theory predicts that capital-market imperfections aﬀect more negatively employment
in the sectors that rely heavily on external ﬁnancing and, as a result, the share of employment
in these sectors is predicted to be positively associated with the level of ﬁnancial development
(enforcement). These predictions are consistent with the evidence reviewed in Section 2 (see
Table 2 and Figures 4 and 5)). Moreover, the theory also accounts for the observation that
the dispersion in output per worker is substantially larger in countries with low than in
countries with high ﬁnancial development (see Table 3).
We now focus on two additional regularities in the data that require more discussion.
First, in the cross-country data, industries with low external dependence tend to have higher
labor productivity than industries with high external dependence. The aggregate labor
productivity in industries with low external dependence, as a fraction of labor productivity
in manufacturing, is above 1 in the three country groups: It is 1.29 in countries with low
ﬁnancial development, 1.34 in countries with middle ﬁnancial development, and 1.14 in
countries with high ﬁnancial development (see Table 3). The fact that labor productivity
is high in industries with low external dependence suggests that these industries are either
capital intensive, skill intensive, or both. Although our analysis did not address this issue,
our model can be extended to incorporate diﬀerences in capital and skill intensities across
sectors, pending the availability of the data.11 A second regularity in the data is that a
decrease in the level of ﬁnancial development − across countries − tends to be associated
with a decrease in the labor productivity of industries with high external dependence relative
to the labor productivity in industries with low external dependence. Our theory is able to
11Notice that the Unido data do not provide measures of capital and skill intensities across industries.
30account for these patterns, provided the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods
is high (above 1). The intuition is as follows.
When the elasticity of substitution is equal to 1 − as in Proposition 3 − producers of
ﬁnal goods spend a ﬁxed expenditure share on each intermediate good. Hence, a reduction
in enforcement implies a reduction in aggregate income that translates into a proportional
reduction in the demand for all intermediate goods. It also implies a decrease in the supply
of all intermediate goods, but this reduction is not symmetric across industries: It is higher
in industries with a high ﬁxed cost of operation. As a result, a decrease in enforcement
makes the goods produced by these industries relatively more scarce, thereby increasing their
relative prices. These changes in prices, in turn, lead to an increase in the relative labor
productivity of industries with high ﬁxed costs. However, when the elasticity of substitution
is above 1, the eﬀects of enforcement on labor productivity across industries can be reversed.
Here, as enforcement decreases, ﬁnal-goods producers substitute inputs towards the cheaper
inputs produced by the low ﬁxed-cost industries. As a result, a decrease in enforcement
raises the demand for the low-cost intermediate goods relative to the high-cost goods.12
When these changes in the demand are suﬃciently strong, the industries with low ﬁxed
costs will experience an increase in the relative prices of their output and, hence, an increase
in their labor productivities relative to other sectors in the economy.13 Thus, the value of
the elasticity of substitution determines how enforcement aﬀects labor productivity across
industries with diﬀerent degrees of external dependence.
12Note that the share of employment by industries with high ﬁxed costs decreases with a reduction in
enforcement. The quantitative importance of these eﬀects is higher the higher the elasticity of substitution
between intermediate goods.
13For tractability reasons, Proposition 3 only considers the case of a unitary elasticity of substitution.
Nonetheless, we have veriﬁed numerically that when the elasticity of substitution is suﬃciently above 1, the
relative labor productivity of industries with high ﬁxed costs decreases with the level of enforcement in the
economy.
315.3 Discussion
There are several distinctive features of the theory that merit further discussion. As in the
seminal work of Parente and Prescott (1999, 2000), our theory explains why ineﬃcient tech-
nologies are used in equilibrium. While Parente and Prescott (1999, 2000) study equilibria
with monopoly-type arrangements, we develop a theory of TFP with competitive markets.
In our theory, entrepreneurs take prices as given but the equilibrium allocation resembles the
outcome of a collusive agreement. Capital-market imperfections constrain entrepreneurial
output, increasing the price of intermediate goods and depressing the equilibrium wage rate.
Entrepreneurs, as a class, beneﬁt from credit-market imperfections since they allow them
to extract rents. Entrepreneurs could also extract rents through a collusive agreement, but
that would be diﬃcult to enforce since each entrepreneur would face incentives to increase
his production. It is thus important that capital-market imperfections provide an incentive-
compatible mechanism beneﬁting entrepreneurs, a result that is consistent with the views
of Rajan and Zingales (2003). In discussing the impediments to ﬁnancial development, Ra-
jan and Zingales point out that industrial incumbents may lose with ﬁnancial development
since the latter breeds competition which, in turn, erodes incumbents’ proﬁts. Industrial
incumbents may also ﬁnd it advantageous to leave ﬁnance underdeveloped as opposed to
directly banning entry. Direct-entry restrictions often require costly enforcement, especially
when the product whose market is being restricted has many close substitutes. Moreover,
the bureaucracy in charge of regulation is likely to demand a fraction of the proﬁts made
by the industrial incumbents. In contrast, as Rajan and Zingales argue, leaving ﬁnance
underdeveloped is an act of omission and may thus be much easier to implement.
Economic historians and economists (North (1988); Engerman and Sokoloﬀ (1997); Ace-
moglu, Johnson and Robinson (2000)) have long emphasized that institutions are crucial
for understanding the diﬀerential path of development across similar countries in the world.
This view raises the challenge of explaining where the diﬀerences in institutions come from.
Kocherlakota (2001) addresses this question using a mechanism design approach. He de-
velops a framework in which limited enforcement restricts the ability of the social planner
to tax individuals and redistribute social surplus. He shows that limited enforcement and
32high inequality are crucial for understanding why societies choose institutions leading to the
ineﬃcient use of the means of production. Our ﬁndings also point to the importance of
inequality and limited commitment but in the context of a growth model in which limited
enforcement aﬀects the provision of incentives in the capital markets. In discussing episodes
from economic history, Sokoloﬀ and Engerman (2000) argue that the diﬀerent environments
in which the Europeans established their colonies may have led to societies with very dif-
ferent degrees of inequality and that these diﬀerences might have persisted over time and
aﬀected the course of development through their impact on the institutions that evolved.
Restuccia et al. (2003) ﬁnd that the low agricultural productivity in poor countries is
explained by low use of intermediate goods (such as pesticides, chemical fertilizers, and fuel).
They also document that prices of intermediate goods are relatively high in poor countries.
They calibrate a two-sector growth model with an explicit agricultural sector and ﬁnd that
cross-country diﬀerences in relative price play an important role in understanding cross-
country diﬀerences in the use of intermediate goods and, thus, in agricultural productivity.
They argue that "barriers to labor mobility" are needed in order to explain the high employ-
ment share of agriculture in poor countries. While our paper does not model the agricultural
sector explicitly, it does provide a theory with the ingredients for explaining the observations
in Restuccia et al. (2003): In our theory, a decrease in enforcement increases the relative
price of intermediate goods, thereby decreasing the use of intermediate goods and labor
productivity in the ﬁnal-goods sector sector. Moreover, low enforcement limits employment
in the intermediate goods sectors with high relative productivity. Thus, the theory implies
that to the extent that the production of agricultural inputs in poor countries are subject
to capital-market imperfections, we should expect poor countries to be characterized by low
labor productivity and a high employment share in agriculture, as documented in Section 2.
Our theory can also provide some insights about the low real investment rates in poor
countries. Hsieh and Klenow (2002) argue that poor countries have low real investment
rates because they are plagued with low eﬃciency in the production of investment goods,
which leads to a high relative price of capital and a low real investment rate. If we extended
our model to include an investment sector that relies heavily on external ﬁnancing, then
33the relative price of investment would be high in poor countries.14 Interestingly, Rajan and
Zingales (1998) ﬁnd that Machinery ranks among the industries most highly dependent on
external ﬁnancing.
6C o n c l u s i o n
The contribution of this paper is to build a general equilibrium theory with endogenously
motivated ﬁnancial intermediation that provides an explanation for the following observa-
tions characterizing poor countries: i) use of ineﬃcient technologies, ii) low aggregate TFP,
iii) large productivity diﬀerences across industries, iv) large employment shares of low pro-
ductivity sectors, and v) relative prices that diﬀer from those in rich countries. The theory
also suggests that entrepreneurs have a vested interest in maintaining a status quo with low
enforcement since it allows them to extract economic rents from the factors that they hire.
We view our theory to be related to Parente and Prescott’s (1999, 2000) theory of
monopoly unions of specialized input suppliers. Since economic rents provide incentives
to workers to organize themselves as a union, capital-market imperfections may be an im-
portant element in understanding in which industries the forces emphasized by Parente and
P r e s c o t ta r em o r ei m p o r t a n t .
It would be interesting to study the issues addressed in this paper in a framework with
dynamic contracts. In this way, we can study how capital-market imperfections aﬀect entre-
preneurial selection and ﬁrm growth across industries. It would also be interesting to study
the consequences of capital-market imperfections for international trade. We conjecture that
capital-market institutions are an important determinant of industry specialization across
countries. We leave these issues for future research.
14We emphasize that our theory only pins down relative prices. If we assume that investment goods
are tradable, then low productivity in the tradable sector will imply a low wage rate and a low price of
non-tradable goods (such as hair cuts and other non-tradable services). In a recent paper, Castro et al.
(2005) develop a theory in which countries with weaker investor protection also face a higher relative price
of investment goods. In their theory, ﬁrms producing capital goods face a higher level of indiosyncratic risk
than their counterparts producing consumption goods.
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8 Appendix








h < b Z. Then, we set an alternative contract
with Z2












h (notice that the allocation for low-types is not
changed). Notice that enforceability of contract 1 implies enforceability of contract 2. To





















= φqz b Z.
Similarly, contract 2 is resource feasible since it requires the same amount of aggregate
expenditure in variable inputs, external ﬁnancing, and payments as contract 1 but less
expenditure in ﬁxed inputs (since e2
h <e 1
h). Moreover, contract 2 is incentive-compatible
for low-productivity entrepreneurs since their payoﬀ for lying is lower under contract 2 than
under contract 1 ( the decrease in eh relaxes the incentive-compatibility constraint for low-





h)(w+f) > 0 since e1
h >e 2
h, contradicting the optimality of contract 1. Using a similar
type of argument, it is easy to show that el > 0 implies Zl = b Z. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. B yL e m m a1w ec a ns e tZl = Zh = b Z. By multiplying the
enforcement constraint of agent i by ei and by deﬁning e Li = eiLi we can express the optimal
problem of the intermediary as a linear programming problem in (e Ll, e Lh,e l,e h):
maxν
n




qz b Zeh − e Lh +( 1− eh)w
o
s.t.
e Li ≤ φqz b Zei
qz b Zei − e Li +( 1− ei)w ≥ qz
Ai
Aj
(1 − φ)b Zej +( 1− ej)w
v(yl b Z + f)el +( 1− ν)(yh b Z + f)eh ≤ νe Ll +( 1− ν) e Lh + η.
0 ≤ ei ≤ 1, e Li ≥ 0.
Notice that el > 0 only if the incentive compatibility of low-types binds. The enforcement
constraint of high-type and the feasibility constraint also bind (since qz >y h). As a result, we
have three equations to be satisﬁed. The linearity of the constraints and objective function
implies that either e Ll =0or φqz b Zel. We then have four linear equations in four unknowns.
Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . As we previously showed, when the incentive-compatibility
constraint of low-quality entrepreneurs binds, el(χ) is given by equation 9 and eh(χ) is
obtained from combining equations 8 and 9, where χ is the fraction of output that low-types
contract to repay at the end of the period. By Lemma 2 we know that χ is either equal to 0
or φ in an optimal contract. Denote by ce(χ) the entrepreneurs’ consumption as a function
of χ:
c
e(χ) ≡ ν[el(χ)qz b Z(1 − χ)+( 1− el(χ))w]+( 1− ν)[eh(χ)qz(1 − φ)b Z +( 1− eh(χ))w].
38Then χ = φ is optimal if and only if ce(φ) ≥ ce(0). Using the expressions derived for el(χ)
and eh(χ) we obtain
c
e(χ)=















¶ + w (15)

















, we obtain that ce(0) ≤ ce(φ))i f
and only if
(
ν(qz b Z − w)+( 1− ν)(qz b Z(1 − φ) − w)
Ã
qz b Z − w
(1 − φ) qz
Al
Ah





[qz b Z(1 − φ) − w]
"
ν +( 1− ν)
Ã
(1 − φ)qz b Z − w
(1 − φ) qz
Al
Ah
b Z − w
!#)
N ≤ 0, (16)
which is equivalent to
h
(qz b Z − w)M − (qz b Z(1 − φ) − w)N
i"
ν +( 1− ν)
(qz b Z(1 − φ) − w)
((1 − φ) qz
Al
Ah
b Z − w)
#
≤ 0. (17)
Since (qz b Z − w)M − (qz b Z(1 − φ) − w)N} = νqzφ[b Z(−qz + yl)+f + w], the previous
inequality can be written as
νqzφ
h
b Z(−qz + yl)+f + w
i
(
ν +( 1− ν)
(qz b Z(1 − φ) − w)
((1 − φ) qz
Al
Ah
b Z − w)
)
≤ 0. (18)
T h es i g no fe x p r e s s i o no nt h eL H So ft h ea b o v ei n e q u a l i t yi sd e t e r m i n e db yt h es i g no ft h e




(1−φ)qz b Z (the ﬁrst inequality follows from the assumption that the incentive compatibility
of low-quality entrepreneurs binds). It then follows that ce(0) ≤ ce(φ) if and only if
b Z(qz − yl) − w − f ≥ 0. (19)
This condition says that the revenue from operating low-quality projects (net of operating
costs) should be higher than the opportunity cost of entrepreneurs’ time. We thus conclude
39that it is optimal to set χ = φ if it is proﬁtable for the ﬁnancial intermediary to operate
low-quality projects. On the other hand, if w>b Z(qz − yl) − f, it is optimal to set χ =0 .
Thus, when the parameter region is such that b Z(qz−yl)−f<w<(1−φ) qz
Al
Ah
b Z is optimal
to set el = el(0) > 0 and χ =0 . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. We start by writing the intermediary’s problem. The inter-









qz b Z − (b Zy h + f + w)
o
− η + w.
This maximization is subject to the intermediary’s budget constraint
νe l (b Zy l + f)+( 1− ν) eh (b Zy h + f)=νe lχlqz b Z +( 1− ν) ehχhqz b Z + η, (20)
enforcement constraints χj ≤ φ for j = l,j, and the incentive compatibility constraint
el (1 − χl)qz b Z +( 1− el)w ≥ eh (1 − φ)qz b Z
Al
Ah
+( 1− eh)w. (21)
The F.O.C. with respect to {el,e h,χ l,χ h} are
el : ν
n
qz b Z − (b Zy l + f + w)
o
+ λν {χqz b Z − (b Zy l + f)} + γ{(1 − χ)qz b Z − w} ≤ 0,=0if el > 0. (22)
eh :( 1 − ν)
n
qz b Z − (b Zy h + f + w)
o
+ λ(1 − ν){ χhqz b Z − (b Zy h + f)} − γ{(1 − φ)qz b Z
Al
Ah
− w} =0 . (23)
χl : λν elqz b Z + γel (−1)qz b Z
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
=0if χl ∈ (0,φ),
≤ 0i fχl =0 ,
≥ 0 if χl = φ.
(24)
χh : λ(1 − ν) ehqz b Z
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
=0if χh ∈ (0,φ),
≤ 0i fχh =0 ,
≥ 0 if χh = φ,
(25)
where λ and ν are the multipliers associated to the constraints (20) and (21) for the case
j = l.
Multiply (22) by el and (23) by eh to obtain













eh{(1 − φ)qz b Z
Al
Ah
− w} − el{(1 − χl)qz b Z − w}
¶
.
40From (25) we know that λ>0 implies χh = φ. Moreover, 0 <χ h <φonly if λ =0 .
Using (20), (21), (26), and the Kuhn-Tucker complementary slackness conditions we obtain
elπl+ehπh = λη. Thus, proﬁts are positive if and only if λ>0. We conclude that proﬁts are
positive if and only if the enforcements-constraint for high types binds (λ>0 and χh = φ).
QED.
Proof of Proposition 3.
P r o o fo fP a r ti).We ﬁrst show that assumption A1 implies that proﬁts (πj) are equal
to 0 in all intermediate-goods industries when φ =1 . Consider an economy with the ﬁxed
cost fj =0 , for j =1 ,...,n. We use this economy to ﬁnd an upper bound to the quantity
of intermediate goods produced in the equilibrium of the economy with φ =1and fj ≥ 0.
When fj =0for all j, proﬁts are 0 in industry j (and ej,h < 1) only if equilibrium prices
satisfy w =( qj − yh)b Z, for j =1 ,...,n. Note that qj does not depend on j when fj =0for
all j (all sectors are identical) so that we can neglect the index j from the above equation
and write w =( q − yh)b Z. Using ﬁrms’ FOC and the consumers’ Euler equation (together
with δ =1 ), we can express this equation as a single equation in the ratio of intermediate
goods to labor in the ﬁnal-goods sector sector.15 Denote by z∗ the solution to this equation
(corresponding to the economy with φ =1and fj =0for all j). The quantity of intermediate
goods is bounded above by Z∗ = z∗(1 + 2 ) (since aggregate labor in the economy is less
than 1+2  ).
Now consider an economy with fj ≥ 0 (now fj is not necessarily equal to zero). We
show that if b Z is such that (1 − ν) b Z>Z ∗, then in equilibrium prices are such that w =
(qj − yh)b Z − fj. To this end, note that a necessary condition for positive production is that
w ≤ (qj−yh)b Z−fj (otherwise output in the economy would be 0). Moreover, if prices satisfy
w<(qj − yh)b Z − fj, then the aggregate supply of intermediate good j would be at least
 (1−ν)b Z (and even higher if low-quality entrepreneurs choose to operate their technology),
15Using ﬁrms’ FOC and households’ Euler equation we can obtain w =
(1−α)
αβ k, qz =
kμ
βα(1−μ)z,r=1 /β =
α(1−μ)kα(1−μ)−1zμ, where k and z denote the capital-to-labor and the intermediate goods to labor ratios in
the ﬁnal-goods sector. Then, yh can be written as yh = 1
αAhβk1−α. Combining the expressions just obtained
for w,qz, and yh, the equation w =( qz − yh)b Z can be expressed as an equation in a single unknown (z).
41so that (1 − ν) b Z>Z ∗ implies that the market for intermediate good j would not clear.
Then, for the market to clear it is necessary that w =( qj − yh)b Z − fj. In this case, only a
fraction less than one of high-quality entrepreneurs operate their technology in equilibrium.
By continuity, the above argument holds for φ close to 1. When φ is close to 1, enforcement
and incentive-compatibility constraints do not bind (for all industries). Therefore, a decrease
in enforcement φ around 1 does not aﬀect equilibrium allocations and prices, and value added
per worker is constant across industries (as in the economy with φ =1 ) .
Proof of Part ii). Denote the equilibrium prices of the economy with φ =1by
(w∗,q∗
1,...q∗
n). When φ =1 , a small decrease in the level of enforcement does not aﬀect
equilibrium allocations and prices. Denote by φ
e the treshold value of enforcement for which
the enforcement constraint binds for the ﬁrst time for some industry in the economy. Denote
by j this industry. We now show how to determine φ
e under the assumption that elj =0
when φ = φ
e.16 The results that follow can also be derived when parameters are such that
elj > 0 when φ = φ
e, and are omitted for brevity.
The threshold value of enforcement φ
e is obtained by solving for φ from the intermediary’s
b u d g e tc o n s t r a i n ta te q u a l i t y( s e t t i n gelj = Llj =0and Lh = φqj b Z)
mj (b Zy
∗
h + fj)= mjφq
∗
j b Z + η
∗,
where mj =( 1 −ν) ehj is the number of projects operated. Because the enforcement constraint
starts binding at φ = φ
e, we know that proﬁts of industry j are πj = q∗
j b Z−(b Zy ∗
h+fj+w∗)=0 .
Since, in equilibrium, η∗ = w∗/β, we obtain
mj (b Zy
∗
h + fj) − w
∗/β = mj(b Zy
∗
h + fj + w
∗)φ,






h + fj + w∗ −
w∗
mj(b Zy ∗
h + fj + w∗)β
.
16As u ﬃcient condition for this to be true is that 1+ 1
β(1−ν)e∗
hn < Ah
Al , where e∗
hn denotes the equilibrium
value of ehn in the economy with φ =1 . Note that e∗
hn does not depend on Al for Al <A h since low-
productivity projects are not operated when φ =1 . As a result, the condition holds in economies with Al
suﬃciently small.
42Under assumption A1, optimality by ﬁrms in the ﬁnal-goods sector implies that mjqj b Z =
μY/n, which using πj =0implies mj =
μY/n
e Zy h+fj+w . Plugging this expression into the above
formula for φ











e only depends on j through the term fj. It follows from (27) that φ
e is an
increasing function of fj. Thus, as φ decreases below 1, the enforcement constraint binds
ﬁrst in the industry with the highest ﬁxed cost (j = n).N o t et h a tw eh a v ei m p o s et h a tt h e
incentive compatibility constraints do not bind for φ ≥ φ
e
j (otherwise prices would change
with φ). We now ﬁnd conditions so that this holds true. Given prices of the economy with

























Al , which is true if Al
is chosen small enough (note that e∗
h does not depend on Al for Al <A h since e∗
l =0 ) .
We now show that when the enforcement constraint of an industry binds, its value added
p e rw o r k e ri si n c r e a s i n gi nt h eﬁxed cost of the industry. We then study how changes in
e n f o r c e m e n ti m p a c ta c r o s si n d u s t r i e st h a td i ﬀer on fj. We divide the analysis in two cases.
Case 1: Consider the case elj =0(low-productivity entrepreneurs do not operate their
technology). In this case, the intermediary’s budget constraint is given by mj(b Zy h + fj)=
φmjqj b Z +η, where the mass of ﬁrms in industry j is mj =( 1−ν)ehj. Under assumption A2,
optimization by ﬁrms in the ﬁnal-goods sector sector implies that the value of production
in industry j, qjYj, satisﬁes qjYj = qjmj b Z = μY/n, where μ is the share of intermediate
goods in the production of ﬁnal goods. Combining the expressions just obtained, we can get
mj =
φμY/n+η
e Zy h+fj . Proﬁts in industry j are given by πj = qjmj b Z −w (mj +Nj)−rKj −mj fj,
where Kj and Nj denote aggregate capital and labor in industry j. Note that the number
of workers and capital hired per project is constant across industries (since the scale of
operation b Z and the marginal cost of production is constant across industries) so that the
ratios
Kj
mj = KI and
Nj
mj = NI are constant in j. We thus have Nj = mjNI =
φμY/n+η
e Zy h+fj NI. We















− (w + fj)
m
N








− (w + fj)
1
NI
− w − rk
=












− w − rk. (29)
Notice that the sign of the term multiplying fj depends on the sign of
μY
φμY +nη −1, which can
be expressed as
(1−φ)μY −nη
φμY +nη . The numerator of this term is given by the value of production
by all intermediate-goods industries (μY ), minus repayment of loans (φμY ), minus internal
ﬁnancing by entrepreneurs nη. When enforcement binds, proﬁts of the industry are positive
so that
(1−φ)μY −nη
φμY +nη > 0. Then, an increase in fj implies an increase in proﬁtp e rw o r k e r
(notice that fj is the only term in (29) that depends on j). Then, (14) implies that value
added per worker increases with fj.
To study the impact of a small change in φ across industries, consider industries j1













∂φ > 0 (using fj2 >f j1 and
∂yh
∂φ > 0).U s i n g
Nj
mj = NI and
Yj












∂φ > 0. Since
qj1Yj1








∂φ < 0. As a result, output, employment, and prices become more equal across
industries j1 and j2 after a small increase in φ.
Proposition 2 shows that proﬁts in industry j are positive when the enforcement con-
straint associated to this industry binds. In this case, capital and labor inputs have a higher
marginal product in industry-j than in the ﬁnal-goods sector sector. As a result, if there
were a small increase in φ, both factors of production would move towards industry-j. As a
result, industry-j’s employment (Nj) and output (Yj) increase.
Case 2: Assume that elj > 0. In this case, the intermediary’s budget constraint is given
by νe l (b Zy l + f)+( 1− ν) eh (b Zy h + f)=φ(νe lj +( 1− ν) ehj)qj b Z + η = φμY/n +
η, w h e r ef o rd e r i v i n gt h es e c o n de q u a l i t yw eu s e dqjYj = μY/n. When b Z is large, (10)




Al for any industry such that el > 0. Substituting ehj =
Ah
Al elj




Al , we get elj =
φμY/n + η.
















mi = NI (since average productivity is constant across






















b Zy l +[ ν +( 1− ν)
Ah
Al ]fj
[ν +( 1− ν)
Ah
Al ](φμY/n + η).
1
NI












− w − rk.
As in case 1,
μY
φμY +nη − 1 > 0. Then, an increase in fj leads to an increase in
πj
Nj and in
value added per worker.
To study the impact of a small change in φ across industries, consider industries j1 and


















∂φ > 0 implies that both the
numerator and denominator increase with φ. Moreover, fj1 <f j2 implies that the numerator












∂φ > 0. Since
qj1Yj1








∂φ < 0. As a result, output, employment, and prices
become more equal across industries j1 and j2 after a small increase in φ.
P r o o fo fP a r tii c).
When φ =0 , we note that elj > 0 if and only if w<q j
Al
Ah
b Z. This condition is
equivalent to (after using optimization by consumers and ﬁrms in the ﬁnal good sector)
(1−α)k
αβ <
μkA l e Z
αβ(1−μ) nz jAh, where k and zj denote the capital-to-labor ratio and the interme-
diate goods−j -to-labor ratio in the ﬁnal-goods sector. Using zj <  
n
e Z
1, we obtain (after
simple algebra) that a suﬃcient condition for elj > 0 (for all j) is μ>
(1−α) Ah
Al +(1−α) Ah = μ∗. By
continuity, we can extend this argument to φ close to 0.
When elj > 0 the average productivity of projects being operated increases with the ratio






∂φ )[(1 − φ)
Al
Ah









b Z − Rj)2 ,























∂φ > 0. To see that
∂Rj
∂φ > 0, note that equations (10) and (11) imply that
the number of businesses operated increases with φ (for ﬁxed prices). As a result, for ﬁxed
prices, the supply of good-j increases and the demand for labor increases. In order for the
markets to clear, qj should decrease and w should increase, that is, R should increase.
QED.
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Figure 1: Labor Productivity and Employment in Agriculture and Non Agriculture - 1985.






























































































Figure 2: Standard Deviation of Ln Labor Productivity Across Industries -(1996-2000).









































































Figure 3: Gini Index of Labor Productivity Across Industries-(1996-2000).












































































Figure 4: Employment in Industries with High External Dependence-(1996-2000).













































































Figure 5: Employment in Industries with Low External Dependence-(1996-2000).
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